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Abstract
I extend Spence’s (1974) labor market signaling model by assuming some
workers are overconﬁdent and some underconﬁdent. Overconﬁdent (under-
conﬁdent) workers underestimate (overestimate) their marginal cost of ac-
quiring education. Firms cannot observe workers’ productive abilities and
cannot observe workers’ beliefs. However, ﬁrms know the fraction of over-
conﬁdent, underconﬁdent, and high-ability workers in the economy. I ﬁnd
that the presence of overconﬁdent and/or underconﬁdent workers in the la-
bor market compresses wages. I show that workers’ biased beliefs reduce
welfare when workers are suﬃciently diﬀerent in terms of productivity and
cost of education. Finally, I show that if the fraction of overconﬁdent workers
is relatively low and workers are suﬃciently similar in terms of productivity
and cost of education, then biased beliefs improve welfare.
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11 Introduction
This paper explores the implications of biased self-evaluations in the clas-
sic model of labor market signaling by Spence (1973). Firms are perfectly
competitive and cannot observe workers’ productive abilities, which may be
either high or low. Some workers know their marginal cost of acquiring edu-
cation but others do not. Overconﬁdent workers believe that their marginal
cost of acquiring education is low when, in fact, it is high. Underconﬁdent
workers believe that their marginal cost of acquiring education is high when,
in fact, it is low. Firms cannot observe workers’ beliefs but know the frac-
tion of high-ability, overconﬁdent and underconﬁdent workers in the labor
market.
The main ﬁnding of the paper is that wage compression can arise because
of workers’ biased self-evaluations. Wage compression is a key feature of labor
markets and has important consequences for labor market performance. For
example, Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) demonstrate that wage compression
may encourage employers to oﬀer and pay for general training. Lindquist
(2005) shows that, when labour markets are competitive, even low degrees
of wage compression lead to large welfare losses from costly unemployment
among low-skilled workers.
The economics literature has proposed several explanations for wage com-
pression, ranging from labor market institutions, to incentives not to sab-
otage colleagues competing in a tournament, to fairness considerations in
wage-setting decisions by ﬁrms.1
I show that wage compression arises quite naturally in a competitive
labor market where workers have biased beliefs about their marginal cost
of acquiring education, ﬁrms do not know workers’ skills and beliefs, and
education is a signal of workers’ productive abilities. The intuition behind
this result is straightforward.
In a signaling equilibrium with biased workers, overconﬁdent and unbi-
ased high-ability workers choose a high education level and underconﬁdent
and unbiased low-ability workers choose a low education level. The opti-
mal response of ﬁrms to the fact that overconﬁdence raises the proportion
of low-ability workers in the high education group whereas underconﬁdence
raises the proportion of high-ability workers in the low education group is to
compress wages.
1I review the relevant literature in Section 4.
2I also ﬁnd that biased beliefs reduce welfare if workers are suﬃciently dif-
ferent in terms of productivity and cost of education. When all workers are
unbiased, Spence’s (1974) model shows that if the two groups of workers are
suﬃciently diﬀerent, then one can have a signaling equilibrium where invest-
ments in education are the eﬃcient ones and the outcome is as if there was
perfect information in the market place. Introducing a distortion—workers’
biased beliefs—reduces welfare.
Finally, I show that if workers are suﬃciently similar in terms of produc-
tivity and cost of education, then biased beliefs can improve welfare. When
all workers are unbiased, Spence’s (1974) model shows that if the two groups
of workers are suﬃciently similar in terms of productivity and cost of educa-
tion, then there exist separating equilibria with overinvestment in education
by the more productive group. In this case private information about pro-
ductive ability reduces welfare. However, it is possible to improve market
eﬃciency with an optimal tax-subsidy schedule that consists of a rising tax
on education combined with a lump-sum transfer to everyone so that net
tax revenues are zero. Spence (2002) shows that the optimal tax-subsidy
schedule implies that high-ability workers will pay a net tax and choose their
optimal level of education whereas low-ability workers receive a net subsidy.
The reason why workers’ biased beliefs raise welfare are similar to those
why a tax-subsidy schedule raises welfare. Overconﬁdence is like a “tax” on
the education of unbiased high-ability workers because it lowers their wage
and this brings their education level closer to the optimal. Underconﬁdence
is like a “subsidy” for unbiased low-ability workers because it raises their
wage for a given education level. This result is consistent with the theory
of the second best. According to this theory, introducing a new distortion–
workers’ biased beliefs–in an environment where another distortion is al-
ready present–private information about skill–, may increase welfare.
Of course, welfare does not always rise when workers have biased beliefs
and are suﬃciently similar in terms of productivity and cost of education.
If the fraction of overconﬁdent workers is too high, unbiased high-ability
workers are “overtaxed” and end up doing worse than high-ability workers.
In this case there is a transfer of utility from unbiased high-ability to unbiased
low-ability workers.
One implication of the welfare results is that policies that try to improve
workers’ self-evaluations will reduce welfare when the fraction of overconﬁ-
dent workers is low and workers are suﬃciently similar in terms of produc-
tivity and cost of education. In contrast, if either (i) workers are suﬃciently
3diﬀerent or (ii) a signiﬁcant fraction of workers is overconﬁdent and workers
are suﬃciently similar, then improving self-evaluations improves welfare.
The assumption that some workers are overconﬁdent and some undercon-
ﬁdent is supported by robust empirical evidence on patterns of over- and un-
derestimation in self-evaluation of skills. Overconﬁdence is a staple ﬁnding in
psychology and has been shown to be present in individuals’ self-assessments
of performance in their jobs. According to Myers (1996), a textbook in so-
cial psychology, “(...) on nearly any dimension that is both subjective and
socially desirable, most people see themselves as better than average.”2
Kruger and Dunning (1999) ﬁnd that it is the poorest performers who
hold the least accurate evaluations of their skills and performances, grossly
overestimating how well their performances stack up against those of their
peers. They observe that students performing in the bottom 25% among
their peers on tests of grammar, logical reasoning, and humor tend to think
that they are performing above the 60% percentile. They also ﬁnd that top
performers consistently underestimate how superior their performances are
relative to their peers. In Kruger and Dunning (1999) studies, the top 25%
tended to think that their skills lay in the 70-75% percentile, although their
performances fell roughly in the 87% percentile.3
This paper is an additional contribution to the growing literature on the
impact of behavioral biases on markets and organizations. DellaVigna and
Malmendier (2004), Glenn Ellison (2005), and Gabaix and Laibson (2006)
study market interactions between sophisticated ﬁrms and biased consumers.
They ﬁnd that in competitive markets, biased consumers may be indirectly
exploited by sophisticated consumers.
Sandroni and Squintani (2007) investigate the policy implications of over-
conﬁdence in insurance markets. They ﬁnd that if a signiﬁcant fraction of
agents are overconﬁdent and insurance ﬁrms cannot directly observe agents’
beliefs, then compulsory insurance fails to make all agents better oﬀ because
2Baker et al. (1988) cite a survey of General Electric Company employees according
to which 81 percent of a sample of white-collar clerical and technical workers rated their
own performance as falling within the top 20 percent of their peers in similar jobs. Myers
(1996) cites a study according to which, in Australia, 86 percent of people rate their job
performance as above average.
3These patterns have been replicated among undergraduates completing a classroom
exam (Dunning et al. 2003), medical students assessing their interviewing skills (Hodges
et al. 2001), clerks evaluating their performance (Edwards et al. 2003), and medical
laboratory technicians evaluating their on-the-job expertise (Haun et al. 2000).
4it is detrimental to low-risk agents. Thus, behavioral biases may weaken
asymmetric information rationales for government intervention in insurance
markets because they may turn policies beneﬁcial to all agents into wealth
transfers between agents.
The paper closest related to mine is Fang and Moscarini (2005). They
use a principal-agent model to study the implication of worker overconﬁ-
dence on the ﬁrm’s optimal wage-setting policies. Wage contracts provide
incentives and aﬀect workers’ conﬁdence in their own skills, by revealing
private information of the ﬁrm about workers’ skills. They ﬁnd, using nu-
merical examples, that overconﬁdence is a necessary condition for a ﬁrm to
choose a non-diﬀerentiation wage policy (the most extreme form of wage com-
pression). This happens because, when ability and eﬀort are complements,
a non-diﬀerentiation wage policy preserves worker overconﬁdence which in
turn induces higher eﬀort, oﬀsetting the moral hazard ineﬃciency.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets-up the model. Sections 3
describes the equilibria. Section 4 shows that workers’ biased beliefs compress
wages. Section 5 discusses the impact of biased beliefs on welfare. Section 6
concludes. Proofs of all results are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
For each worker there are two possible productive abilities, low, θL, and high,
θH, with 0 < θL < θH. Nature determines a worker’s productive ability and
beliefs about marginal cost of acquiring education. The worker chooses a
level of education, e ≥ 0, based on her beliefs. Two ﬁrms, 1 and 2, observe
the worker’s education and then simultaneously make wage oﬀers w1 and w2,
with wi ≥ 0, i = 1,2. The worker accepts the highest of the two wage oﬀers,
ﬂipping a coin in case of a tie.
The payoﬀ of a ﬁrm that employs a worker with ability θ and education
e is π(w,e,θ) = y(e,θ) −w, where y(e,θ) is the worker’s output. The payoﬀ
of a ﬁrm that does not employ a worker is zero. High-ability workers are
more productive: yθ(e,θ) > 0. Education does not reduce productivity, that
is, ye(e,θ) ≥ 0 where ye(e,θ) is the marginal productivity of education for a
worker of ability θ at education e. The marginal productivity of education is
non-increasing with education: yee(e,θ) ≤ 0. The marginal productivity of
education is non-decreasing with ability: yeθ(e,θ) ≥ 0.
There are four types of workers in the labor market. Unbiased high-
5ability workers have marginal cost of acquiring education ce(e,θH) and know
it. Unbiased low-ability workers have marginal cost of acquiring education
ce(e,θL) and know it. Overconﬁdent workers believe their marginal cost of
acquiring education is ce(e,θH) when, in fact, it is ce(e,θL). Underconﬁdent
workers believe their marginal cost of acquiring education is ce(e,θL) when,
in fact, it is ce(e,θH). Let λ ∈ (0,1) be the fraction of high-ability workers,
ν ∈ [0,λ] be the fraction of underconﬁdent workers, and κ ∈ [0,1−λ] be the
fraction of overconﬁdent workers. Firms cannot observe a worker’s productive
ability or beliefs, but know λ, κ and ν.
The utility of an employed worker is u(w,e,θ) = w − c(e,θ), where w
is the wage oﬀer made by a ﬁrm and c(e,θ) is the cost to a worker with
ability θ to obtaining education e. The utility of an unemployed worker is
zero. The cost of no education is zero: c(0,θ) = 0. The cost of education
increases with education: ce(e,θ) > 0, where ce(e,θ) is the marginal cost of
education for a worker of ability θ at education e. The cost of education
decreases with ability: cθ(e,θ) < 0. The marginal cost of education increases
with education: cee(e,θ) > 0. The marginal cost of education decreases with
ability: ceθ(e,θ) < 0.4
3 Equilibria
In a separating equilibrium, education choices are determined by workers’
beliefs about their marginal cost of acquiring education: underconﬁdent and
unbiased low-ability workers choose a low education level, eLU, whereas over-
conﬁdent and unbiased high-ability workers choose a high education level,
eHO, with eHO ∈ [ˆ eB,¯ eB], and eHO > eLU. Firms cannot distinguish between
underconﬁdent and unbiased low-ability workers because, at the time wage
oﬀers are made, both types of workers have the same education level: eLU.
Similarly, ﬁrms cannot distinguish between overconﬁdent and unbiased high-
ability workers because both types of workers display the same education
level eHO. However, ﬁrms know λ, κ and ν.
Among all workers who choose an education level eLU ﬁrms know that
fraction α = ν
1−λ−κ+ν has high ability and fraction 1 − α = 1−λ−κ
1−λ−κ+ν low-
ability. Among all workers who choose an education level eHO ﬁrms know
4This assumption is critical because it implies that workers who think they have a high
marginal cost of aquiring education ﬁnd signaling more costly than those who think they
have a low marginal cost of acquring education.
6that fraction β = κ
λ+κ−ν has low ability and fraction 1 − β = λ−ν
λ+κ−ν high-
ability. Thus, in a separating equilibrium, the ﬁrms’ posterior belief that a
worker has high ability after observing education level e are
 (θH|e) =
￿
α, for e < eHO
1 − β, for e ≥ eHO .
The ﬁrms’ strategy is then
w(e) =
￿
(1 − α)y(e,θL) + αy(e,θH), for e < eHO
βy(e,θL) + (1 − β)y(e,θH), for e ≥ eHO . (1)
The ﬁrms’ strategy is derived from the assumption that ﬁrms make zero
proﬁts in equilibrium and that ﬁrms know λ, κ and ν. Competition between
ﬁrms implies that the wage oﬀered to each group of workers (those who
choose eLU and those who choose eHO) must be a weighted average of the
productivities of each type of worker in the group.
In a separating equilibrium underconﬁdent and unbiased low-ability work-
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and overconﬁdent and unbiased high-ability workers do not envy undercon-
ﬁdent and unbiased low-ability workers, that is
βy(e







A necessary condition for separating equilibria to exist is that the wage
paid to overconﬁdent and unbiased low-ability workers is higher than that
paid to underconﬁdent and unbiased low-ability workers. Since in a separat-
ing equilibrium eLU < eHO we see from (1) that if α + β ≤ 1, then the wage
paid to overconﬁdent and unbiased low-ability workers is less than that paid
to underconﬁdent and unbiased low-ability workers. Using the deﬁnitions of
α and β, the inequality is equivalent to
(1 − λ)ν + λκ < (1 − λ)λ. (4)
7Condition (4) says that if the fractions of overconﬁdent and underconﬁ-
dent workers are suﬃciently small, education can serve as a signal of produc-
tive ability.5 When the fraction of biased workers is too high, condition (4)
is violated, separating equilibria may no longer exist.6 I assume from now
on that condition (4) is satisﬁed.
Let e∗(σ,α) solve maxe [(1 − α)y(e,θL) + αy(e,θH) − c(e,θL)] and e∗(σ,β)
solve maxe [βy(e,θL) + (1 − β)y(e,θH) − c(e,θH)], where σ = (θL,θH). Let
w∗(σ,α) = (1 − α)y(e∗(σ,α),θL) + αy(e∗(σ,α),θH) and, in addition, let
w∗(σ,β) = βy(e∗(σ,β),θL) + (1 − β)y(e∗(σ,β),θH). Finally, let u∗(σ,α) =
w∗(σ,α) − c(e∗(σ,α),θL)) and u∗(σ,β) = w∗(σ,β) − c(e∗(σ,β),θH)).
There are two qualitatively diﬀerent kinds of separating equilibria. In
one case it is too expensive for underconﬁdent and unbiased low-ability
workers to acquire education e∗(σ,β), even if doing so would make ﬁrms
believe that they are overconﬁdent or unbiased high-ability workers and so
cause them to pay the wage w∗(σ,β), that is, w∗(σ,α) − c(e∗(σ,α),θL) >
w∗(σ,β) − c(e∗(σ,β),θL). In the other case, underconﬁdent and unbiased
low-ability workers prefer the wage w∗(σ,β) and the education level e∗(σ,β)






When inequality (5) is satisﬁed overconﬁdent and unbiased high-ability work-
ers must choose an education level greater than e∗(σ,β) to distinguish them-
selves from underconﬁdent and unbiased low-ability workers, that is, eHO ∈
[ˆ eHO,¯ eHO], with ˆ eHO > e∗(σ,β).7
Proposition 1: In a separating equilibrium: (i) the education level of under-
conﬁdent and unbiased low-ability workers is at least the ﬁrst-best education
5When all workers are unbiased, Spence’s (1974) model shows that education can serve
as a signal of productive ability if the marginal cost of education is decreasing with ability.
6There are always pooling equilibria where all types of workers choose the same educa-
tion level e. The ﬁrms’ posterior belief about a worker’s productive ability after observing
e must be the prior belief,  (θH|e) = λ, which in turn implies that the equilibrium wage
is w = λy(e,θH) + (1 − λ)y(e,θL).
7Inequality (5) is satisﬁed if workers are suﬃciently similar in terms of productivity
and cost of acquiring education and the fraction of biased workers is not too high. To
see this consider the case y(e,θ) = θe and c(e,θ) = e2/2θ. We have e∗(σ,α) = θL(θL +
αρ), e∗(σ,β) = θH(θH − βρ), where ρ = θH − θL. In this case inequality (5) becomes
θL
2 (θL + αρ)
2 < θH






. A necessary condition for this inequality to be





8level of low-ability workers—eLU = e∗(σ,α) ≥ e∗(θL)—, (ii) the wage paid to
underconﬁdent and unbiased low-ability workers is greater than the ﬁrst-best
wage of low ability workers—w(eLU) = w∗(σ,α) > w∗(θL)—, and (iii) the util-
ity of unbiased low-ability workers is greater than the ﬁrst-best utility of low
ability workers—u(w(eLU),eLU,θL) = u∗(σ,α) > u∗(θL).
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. Underconﬁdent workers
think (mistakenly) they have a high marginal cost of acquiring education
and, like unbiased low-ability workers, choose a low education level. Firms
observe this low education level but since they are unable to distinguish
each type of worker, they pay a wage that is equal to the average product
of underconﬁdent and unbiased low-ability workers. This implies that, for
a given education level, the marginal productivity of education is higher for
underconﬁdent and unbiased low-ability workers than for low-ability workers.
Since the marginal cost of education is the same, the education level of under-
conﬁdent and unbiased low-ability workers is at least the ﬁrst-best education
level of low-ability workers. This in turn implies that underconﬁdent and
unbiased low-ability workers are paid a higher wage than the ﬁrst-best wage
of low-ability workers. Finally, the utility of unbiased low-ability workers is
higher than the ﬁrst-best utility of low-ability workers because the favorable
impact of underconﬁdence on the wage is of ﬁrst-order whereas the unfavor-
able impact of underconﬁdence on the cost of education is of second-order.
Proposition 2: If workers are suﬃciently diﬀerent in terms of productivity
and cost of acquiring education or the fraction of biased workers is suﬃciently
high—inequality (5) is violated—, then: (i) the education level of overconﬁdent
and unbiased high-ability workers is at most the ﬁrst-best education level of
high-ability workers—eHO = e∗(σ,β) ≤ e∗(θH)—, (ii) the wage paid to over-
conﬁdent and unbiased high-ability workers is less than the ﬁrst-best wage
of high-ability workers—w(eHO) = w∗(σ,β) < w∗(θH)—, and (iii) the utility
of unbiased high-ability workers is smaller than the ﬁrst-best utility of high-
ability workers—u(w(eHO),eHO,θH) = u∗(σ,β) < u∗(θH).
When workers are suﬃciently diﬀerent in terms of productivity and cost
of education or the fraction of biased workers is suﬃciently high, there is
a unique separating equilibrium. Overconﬁdent workers think (mistakenly)
they have a low marginal cost of acquiring education and, like unbiased
high-ability workers, choose a high education level. Firms observe this high
education level but since they are unable to distinguish each type of worker,
they pay a wage that is equal to the average product of overconﬁdent and un-
9biased high-ability workers. This implies that, for a given education level, the
marginal productivity of education is lower for overconﬁdent and unbiased
high-ability workers than for high-ability workers. Since the marginal cost
of education is the same, the education level of overconﬁdent and unbiased
high-ability workers is at most the ﬁrst-best education level of high-ability
workers. This in turn implies that overconﬁdent and unbiased high-ability
workers are paid a lower wage than the ﬁrst-best wage of high-ability work-
ers. Finally, the utility of unbiased high-ability workers is lower than the
ﬁrst-best utility of high-ability workers because overconﬁdence shifts the ed-
ucation level away from the optimal one and reduces the wage.
Proposition 3 shows that if inequality (5) is satisﬁed, then the education
and wage of overconﬁdent and unbiased high-ability workers in the lowest
(highest) separating equilibrium with biased workers is smaller than the edu-
cation and wage, respectively, of high-ability workers in the lowest (highest)
separating equilibrium with rational workers. Thus, the set of equilibria
education-wage levels of overconﬁdent and unbiased high-ability workers is
“lower” than the set of education-wage levels of high-ability workers.
Proposition 3: If workers are suﬃciently similar in terms of productivity
and cost of acquiring education and the fraction of biased workers is suﬃ-
ciently small—inequality (5) is satisﬁed when α > 0 and β > 0—, then: (i)
the education level of overconﬁdent and unbiased high-ability workers belongs
to [ˆ eHO,¯ eHO], with ˆ eHO < ˆ eH and ¯ eHO < ¯ eH, and (ii) the wage paid to
overconﬁdent and unbiased high-ability workers belongs to [ˆ wHO, ¯ wHO], with
ˆ wHO < ˆ wH and ¯ wHO < ¯ wH.
The intuition behind the result is as follows. In the lowest separating
equilibrium with biased workers the incentive compatibility condition of un-
derconﬁdent and unbiased low-ability workers binds. We know from Propo-
sition 1 part (iii) that the utility of an unbiased low-ability worker is higher
than the ﬁrst-best utility of a low-ability worker. Thus, for the incentive
compatibility condition of underconﬁdent and unbiased low-ability workers
to bind, their education level must be lower than that of high-ability work-
ers. The wage of overconﬁdent and unbiased high-ability workers is smaller
than the wage of high-ability workers because their education and productive
ability are smaller than the education and productive ability, respectively, of
high-ability workers.
104 Wage Compression
A key feature of imperfect labor markets is the presence of wage compression
across skills (see Garibaldi, 2006, pp. 21). In the simplest static model of
a competitive labor market, the relation between productivity and wages is
straightforward: wages equal marginal product. Wage compression refers to
a tendency of wages to be equalized across the skill distribution. For exam-
ple, Campbell and Kamlani (1997) conducted a survey of 184 US ﬁrms and
found that pay diﬀerentials represented about one half of the productivity
diﬀerential between any two workers identical in all respects but productiv-
ity. Frank (1984a) examined wages and productivities of sales workers and
university professors, and found that the more productive workers were paid
less than their marginal product, while the least productive were paid more
than their marginal product.
Economic theory oﬀers two main explanations for wage compression. The
ﬁrst one identiﬁes exogenous labor market frictions and institutions like mo-
bility costs, trade-unions, eﬃciency wages, wage ﬂoors, or any institution
which contributes to raise the reservation wage (e.g., generous unemploy-
ment beneﬁts), as sources of wage compression. Freeman (1982) shows that
unionized ﬁrms appear to have less wage dispersion than non—unionized ones.
The second type of explanations identify endogenous causes for wage
compression. Frank (1984b) shows that if workers value status, then those
who put a highest value on prestige will be willing to work for a wage that
is lower than their marginal product in return for having lower-level workers
around who in return are paid more than their marginal product. In contrast,
Lazear (1989) and Milgrom and Roberts (1990) argue that wage inequalities
may give rise to rent-seeking behavior within ﬁrms when workers change their
behavior with the aim of ensuring wage increases. Wage compression reduces
uncooperative behavior and may be eﬃcient. Akerlof and Yellen (1990) posit
that large wage diﬀerentials between groups may be perceive as unfair and
lead to reduced eﬀort.
In this paper I ﬁnd that wage compression can arise due to workers’ biased
beliefs. I also ﬁnd that workers’ biases compress education levels, that is, the
gradient education-ability is less steep with biased workers than with rational
workers. Corollary 1 summarizes the results.
Corollary 1:
(i) If workers are suﬃciently diﬀerent in terms of productivity and cost of
education—inequality (5) is violated when α = β = 0—, then the equilib-
11rium wage (education) spread with biased workers is smaller than the equi-
librium wage (education) spread with rational workers: △w∗(α,β) < △w∗
(△e∗(α,β) ≤ △e∗);
(ii) If workers are suﬃciently similar in terms of productivity and cost of
education and the fraction of biased workers is not too high—inequality (5)
is satisﬁed when α > 0 and β > 0—, then the wage (education) spread in
the lowest and in the highest separating equilibrium with biased workers is
smaller than the wage (education) spread in the lowest and highest separating
equilibrium with rational workers: △ˆ wB < △ˆ wR and △¯ wB < △¯ wR (△ˆ eB <
△ˆ eR and △¯ eB < △¯ eR).
Corollary 1 follows from Propositions 1, 2 and 3. It shows that wage com-
pression arises quite naturally in a setting where workers have biased beliefs,
ﬁrms do not know workers’ skills and beliefs, and workers use education as
a signal of their productive ability. The intuition behind this result is as
follows.
When workers are suﬃciently diﬀerent in terms of productivity and cost
of education there is a unique separating equilibrium. The equilibrium edu-
cation and wage spreads, in the separating equilibrium with biased workers,
are △e∗(α,β) = e∗(σ,β) − e∗(σ,α) and △w∗(α,β) = w∗(σ,β) − w∗(σ,α),
respectively. The same spreads in the separating equilibrium with rational
workers are △e∗ = e∗(θH)−e∗(θL) and △w∗ = w∗(θH)−w∗(θL), respectively.
The wage paid to a worker in the low-education group is equal to the
average product of that group. The presence of underconﬁdence in the low-
education group implies that the average product of a worker in that group
is greater than the product of a low-ability worker at any given education
level. Since the marginal cost of education is the same, underconﬁdent and
unbiased low-ability workers will choose a higher education level and will be
paid a higher wage than low-ability workers, that is, e∗(σ,α) ≥ e∗(θL) and
w∗(σ,α) > w∗(θL).
The wage oﬀered to a worker in the high-education group is equal to the
average product of that group. The presence of overconﬁdence in the high-
education group implies that the average product of a worker in that group
is lower than the product of a high-ability worker at any given education
level. Since the marginal cost of education is the same, overconﬁdent and
unbiased high-ability workers will choose a lower education level and will be
paid a lower wage than high-ability workers, that is, e∗(σ,β) ≤ e∗(θH) and
w∗(σ,β) < w∗(θH).
12When workers are suﬃciently similar in terms of productivity and cost
of education and the fraction of biased workers is not too high, there is
a continuum of separating equilibria. The equilibrium education and wage
spreads, in the lowest separating equilibrium with biased workers, are △ˆ eB =
ˆ eHO−e∗(σ,α) and △ˆ wB = w(ˆ eHO)−w∗(σ,α), respectively. The same spreads
in the lowest separating equilibrium with rational workers are △ˆ eR = ˆ eH −
e∗(θL) and △ ˆ wR = w(ˆ eH) − w∗(θL), respectively.
In the lowest separating equilibrium, underconﬁdent and unbiased low-
ability workers are indiﬀerent between getting their education-wage contract
and the education-wage contract of overconﬁdent and unbiased high-ability
workers. We know from Proposition 1 part (iii) that the utility of unbiased-
low ability workers is higher than the utility of low-ability workers. Thus,
the only way to make sure that the incentive compatibility condition of
underconﬁdent and unbiased low-ability workers is binding is for overcon-
ﬁdent and unbiased low-ability workers to choose a smaller education level
and be paid a lower wage than high-ability workers, that is, ˆ eHO < ˆ eH and
w(ˆ eHO) < w(ˆ eH).8
Corollary 1 shows that biased beliefs compress wages in the sense that
the wage spread with biased workers is smaller than the wage spread with
rational workers. This is a weak from of wage compression. Can biased
beliefs explain a stronger form of wage compression? To show that they
can, I specialize the model by assuming y(e,θ) = θ and c(e,θ) = eγ/θ, with
γ > 2.9.
Proposition 4: In the specialized model, underconﬁdent and unbiased low-
ability workers receive wage θL+αρ and get zero education and overconﬁdent
and unbiased high-ability workers receive wage θH − βρ and get education
eHO, where [ρθL[1 − (α + β)]]
1
γ ≤ eHO ≤ [ρθH[1 − (α + β)]]
1
γ , and the wage
spread is △wB = ρ[1 − (α + β)] < ρ = △wR = △w∗, with ρ = θH − θL.
This result shows that if education has no impact on productivity, then
workers’ biased beliefs imply wage compression relative to productive abili-
ties, that is, the wage spread is less than the productive ability spread.
8In the highest separating equilibrium the intuition is similar with the diﬀerence that it
is the incentive compatibility constraint of overconﬁdent and unbiased high-ability workers
that binds.
9Under this speciﬁcation education has no impact on productivity. A ﬁrst order predic-
tion of Spence’s (1973) labor market signaling model is that a signal (such as education)
commands a positive price in equilibrium, even when acquiring that signal has no impact
on productivity.
135 Welfare Impact of Biased Beliefs
In this section I characterize the impact that workers’ biased beliefs have
on welfare. To do that I compare welfare levels with biased and rational
workers. In both cases ﬁrms make zero proﬁts so welfare is equal to the
weighted average of the utilities of each group of workers.
To evaluate the utility of a biased worker I take the perspective of an
outside observer who knows the worker’s actual marginal cost of acquiring
education.10 Hence, welfare with biased workers is
W







HO,θL) + (1 − λ − κ)u(w(e
LU),e
LU,θL). (6)
My ﬁrst welfare result shows that workers’ biased beliefs reduce welfare
when workers are suﬃciently diﬀerent in terms of productivity and cost of
acquiring education.
Proposition 5: If workers are suﬃciently diﬀerent in terms of productivity
and cost of acquiring education—inequality (5) is violated when α = β = 0—,
then biased beliefs reduce welfare.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Spence’s (1974) model
shows that if workers are unbiased and suﬃciently diﬀerent in terms of pro-
ductivity and cost of education, then there is a unique separating equilibrium
which is fully eﬃcient. Thus, introducing a distortion in such a setting—
workers’ biased beliefs—reduces welfare.
Let us now consider the case where workers are suﬃciently similarin terms
of productivity and cost of education, that is, inequality (5) is satisﬁed when
α = β = 0. One of the main results of Spence’s (1974) model is that in this
case private information about ability reduces welfare. This happens because
high-ability workers must overinvest in education (by comparison with the
complete information education level) to distinguish themselves from low-
ability workers.11
10This is the “hardest” test. An alternative would be to measure the utility of biased
workers according to their perceived utility function.
11If inequality (5) is violated when α = β = 0, that is, w∗(θL) − c(e∗(θL),θL) >
w∗(θH) − c(e∗(θH,θL), there is a continuum of separating equilibria where high-ability
workers overinvest in education to distinguish themselves from low-ability workers. In this
case eH ∈ [ˆ eH,¯ eH] with ˆ eH > e∗(θH). These various separating equilibria can be Pareto
ranked. In all of them a high-ability worker’s utility is y(eH,θH)−c(eH,θH), a low-ability
14My second welfare shows that if workers are suﬃciently similar in terms of
productivity and cost of education and all biased workers are overconﬁdent,
then welfare is lower with biased workers than with rational ones.
Proposition 6: If no worker is underconﬁdent, workers are suﬃciently sim-
ilar in terms of productivity and cost of acquiring education, the fraction of
overconﬁdent workers is not too high—inequality (5) is satisﬁed when α = 0
and β > 0—, then welfare in the lowest separating equilibrium with biased
workers is smaller than welfare in the lowest separating equilibrium with ra-
tional workers.
This result shows that overconﬁdence reduces welfare when workers are
suﬃciently similar in terms of productivity and cost of education and no
worker is underconﬁdent. This happens because the existence of overconﬁ-
dent workers and the absence of underconﬁdent ones imply that the utility
of unbiased high-ability workers is smaller than the utility of high-ability
workers and the utility of unbiased low-ability workers is equal to that of
low-ability workers.
Can biased beliefs improve welfare when workers are suﬃciently similar
in terms of productivity and cost of acquiring education? We know that the
existence of underconﬁdent workers implies that unbiased low-ability workers
do better than low-ability workers. We also know that the education level
of an unbiased high-ability worker is smaller than the education level of a
high-ability worker. Thus, unbiased high-ability workers might do better
than high-ability workers since they do not need to overinvest in education
as much as high-ability workers do.
Proposition 7: If workers are suﬃciently similar in terms of productivity
and cost of acquiring education, the fraction of biased workers is not too
high—inequality (5) is satisﬁed when α > 0 and β > 0—, and
ˆ e




y(ˆ eH,θH) − y(ˆ eH,θL)
￿
−ue(w(ˆ eH),ˆ eH,θH) + β [ye(ˆ eH,θH) − ye(ˆ eH,θL)]
, (7)
then the utility of an unbiased high-ability worker in the lowest separating
equilibrium with biased workers is higher than the utility of a high-ability
worker in the lowest separating equilibrium with rational workers.
worker’s utility is u∗(θL), and ﬁrms earn zero proﬁts. However, a high-ability worker does
strictly better in equilibria where she gets a lower level of education (and a lower wage)
since this brings her utility closer to the complete information utility u∗(θH). Thus, the
separating equilibrium in which the high-ability worker gets education level ˆ eH Pareto
dominates all others.
15The existence of biased workers has two eﬀects on the utility of unbiased
high-ability workers. On the one hand, it reduces the wage for a ﬁxed educa-
tion level since now unbiased high-ability workers are pooled with low-ability
overconﬁdent workers. On the other hand, it reduces the education level for
a ﬁxed wage. This moves the education level of unbiased high-ability workers
close to the ﬁrst-best (i.e., it reduces overinvestment in education). If the
fraction of overconﬁdent workers is not too high and the fraction of undercon-
ﬁdent workers is not too low—inequality (7) is satisﬁed—, the reduction in the
wage is less than the reduction in the cost of education. Therefore, the util-
ity of unbiased high-ability workers is higher than the utility of high-ability
workers.
To fully characterize the impact of biased beliefs on welfare when workers
are suﬃciently similar in terms of productivity and cost of education we also
need to take into account the utility of biased workers. Generally, we can-
not determine how the ex-post utilities of underconﬁdent and overconﬁdent
workers compare to the utilities of high- and low-ability workers, respectively.
To answer this question I return to the specialized model where education
has no impact on productivity. My last result provides bounds on the frac-
tions of overconﬁdent and underconﬁdent workers under which biased beliefs
improve welfare in the specialized model.
Proposition 8: If



















then welfare in the most eﬃcient separating equilibrium with biased workers is
higher than welfare in the most eﬃcient separating equilibrium with rational
workers, that is, ˆ W R < ˆ W B.
Condition (8) provides an upper bound for the fraction of overconﬁdent
workers and condition (9) provides lower and upper bounds for the fraction
of underconﬁdent workers. When these conditions are satisﬁed, welfare in
the most eﬃcient separating equilibrium with biased workers is higher than
welfare in the most eﬃcient separating equilibrium with rational workers.
The existence of underconﬁdent workers leads to a ﬁrst-order increase in
the wage of unbiased low-ability workers but only a second-order increase in
their cost of education. Thus, unbiased low-ability workers do better than
16low-ability workers. The existence of biased workers lowers the wage and
the cost of education of unbiased high-ability workers. If the fraction of
overconﬁdent workers is suﬃciently low and the fraction of underconﬁdent
workers is suﬃciently high, the fall in cost of education of unbiased high-
ability workers is higher than the fall in the wage. Thus, unbiased high-ability
workers do better than high-ability workers.
6 Conclusion
This paper extends Spence’s (1974) model of labor market signaling by as-
suming that a fraction of workers in the labor market do not accurately
evaluate their marginal cost of acquiring education. More precisely, some
workers are overconﬁdent and some underconﬁdent. In addition, I assume
that ﬁrms know the fractions of overconﬁdent, underconﬁdent, and high-
ability workers.
I ﬁnd that worker overconﬁdence and/or underconﬁdence compress wages
and education levels. Wage compression arises because ﬁrms ﬁnd it to be the
optimal response to the fact that, in a signaling equilibrium with biased
workers, overconﬁdence raises the proportion of low-ability workers in the
high education group whereas underconﬁdence raises the proportion of high-
ability workers in the low education group.
I also ﬁnd that workers’ biased beliefs always reduce welfare when workers
are suﬃciently diﬀerent in terms of productivity and cost of education. In
contrast, biased beliefs can improve welfare when workers are suﬃciently
similar in terms of productivity and cost of education and the fraction of
overconﬁdent workers is relatively small.
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198 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
(i) The education level of underconﬁdent and unbiased low-ability workers,
eLU, is the solution to maxe(1−α)y(e,θL)+αy(e,θH)−c(e,θL). Thus, eLU is
implicitly deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order condition: (1−α)ye(e,θL)+αye(e,θH)−
ce(e,θL) = 0. The second-order condition is satisﬁed since yee ≤ 0, cee > 0,
and α > 0 imply (1 − α)yee(e,θL) + αyee(e,θL) − cee(e,θL) < 0. From the





(1 − α)yee(e,θL) + αyee(e,θL) − cee(e,θL)
≥ 0. (10)
It follows from (10) that eLU ≥ e∗(θL) = argmaxe y(e,θL) − c(e,θL).
(ii) The wage of underconﬁdent and unbiased low-ability workers is w(eLU) =
(1 − α)y(eLU,θL) + αy(eLU,θH). The ﬁrst-best wage of low-ability workers
is w∗(θL) = y(e∗(θL),θL). From (i) we know that eLU ≥ e∗(θL) which im-
plies implies y(eLU,θL) ≥ y(e∗(θL),θL). This together with α > 0 and the
deﬁnitions of w(eLU) and w∗(θL) imply w(eLU) > w∗(θL).
(iii) The utility of education level eLU for an unbiased low-ability worker is






∂α. The ﬁrst term is zero from the Envelope Theorem and the
sign of the second term is positive since yθ > 0. Hence, u(w(eLU),eLU,θL) >
u∗(θL) = y(e∗(θL),θL) − c(e∗(θL),θL). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2:
(i) If inequality (5) is violated, the education level of overconﬁdent and un-
biased high-ability workers, eHO, is the solution to maxeβy(e,θL) + (1 −
β)y(e,θH) − c(e,θH). Thus, eHO is implicitly deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order con-
dition βye(e,θL) + (1 − β)ye(e,θH) − ce(e,θH) = 0. The second-order condi-
tion is satisﬁed since yee ≤ 0, cee > 0, and β > 0 imply βyee(e,θL) + (1 −






βyee(e,θL) + (1 − β)yee(e,θH) − cee(e,θH)
≤ 0. (11)
It follows from (11) that eHO ≤ e∗(θH) = argmaxe y(e,θL) − c(e,θL).
(ii) The wage of overconﬁdent and unbiased high-ability workers is w(eHO) =
βy(eHO,θL)+(1−β)y(eHO,θH). The ﬁrst-best wage of high-ability workers is
20w∗(θH) = y(e∗(θH),θH). From (i) we know that eHO ≤ e∗(θH) which implies
y(eHO,θH) ≤ y(e∗(θH),θH). This together with β > 0 and the deﬁnitions of
w(eHO) and w∗(θH) imply w(eHO) < w∗(θH).
(iii) The utility of education level eHO for an unbiased high-ability worker is






∂β. The ﬁrst term is zero from the Envelope Theorem and the
sign of the second term is negative since yθ > 0. Hence, u(w(eHO),eHO,θH) <
u∗(θH) = y(e∗(θH),θH) − c(e∗(θH),θH). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3:
(i) In the lowest separating equilibrium with biased workers inequality (2)
is binding. Denote the lowest eHO that satisﬁes inequality (2) by ˆ eHO. In a







In the lowest separating equilibrium with rational workers inequality (12) is
binding. Denote the lowest eH that satisﬁes inequality (12) by ˆ eH. Can it be








H,θH) − c(ˆ e
H,θH) − [c(ˆ e
H,θL) − c(ˆ e










HO,θL) − c(ˆ e
HO,θH)],
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from Proposition 1, the equality follows from
the deﬁnition of ˆ eH, and the last inequality follows from: (1) ˆ eHO ≥ ˆ eH >
e∗(θH) implies y(ˆ eH,θH)−c(ˆ eH,θH) ≥ y(ˆ eHO,θH)−c(ˆ eHO,θH), (2) ˆ eHO ≥ ˆ eH
and yeθ(e,θ) ≥ 0 imply y(ˆ eHO,θH)−y(ˆ eHO,θL) ≥ y(ˆ eH,θH)−y(ˆ eH,θL), and
(3) ˆ eHO ≥ ˆ eH, cθ(e,θ) < 0, and ceθ(e,θ) < 0 imply c(ˆ eHO,θL)−c(ˆ eHO,θH) ≥
c(ˆ eH,θL) − c(ˆ eH,θH). Hence, it must be that ˆ eHO < ˆ eH.
In the highest separating equilibrium with biased workers inequality (3) is
binding. Denote the highest eHO that satisﬁes inequality (3) by ¯ eHO. In a







In the highest separating equilibrium with rational workers inequality (13) is
binding. Denote the highest eH that satisﬁes inequality (13) by ¯ eH. Can it




















∗(θL),θH)] = y(¯ e
H,θH) − c(¯ e
H,θH)
> y(¯ e








where the ﬁrst inequality follows from c(eLU,θL)−c(eLU,θH) ≥ c(e∗(θL),θL)−
c(e∗(θL),θH) and Proposition 1, the equality follows from the deﬁnition of
¯ eH, and the last inequality follows from: (1) ¯ eHO ≥ ¯ eH > e∗(θH) implies
y(¯ eH,θH)−c(¯ eH,θH) ≥ y(¯ eHO,θH)−c(¯ eHO,θH), and (2) yθ(e,θ) > 0 implies
y(¯ eHO,θH) − y(¯ eHO,θL) > 0. Hence, it must be that ¯ eHO < ¯ eH.
(ii) If ˆ eHO < ˆ eH, then w(ˆ eHO) = βy(ˆ eHO,θL)+(1 − β)y(ˆ eHO,θH) < y(ˆ eH,θH)
= w(ˆ eH). If ¯ eHO < ¯ eH, then w(¯ eHO) = βy(¯ eHO,θL) + (1 − β)y(¯ eHO,θH) <
y(¯ eH,θH) = w(¯ eH). Q.E.D.




θL + αρ, for e < eHO
θH − βρ, for e ≥ eHO , (14)
where ρ = θH − θL. Underconﬁdent and unbiased low-ability workers choose
zero education since education is not productive. So, eLU = e∗(θL) = 0. In
equilibrium, underconﬁdent and unbiased low-ability workers do not envy
overconﬁdent and unbiased high-ability workers, that is, θL + αρ ≥ θH −
βρ − (eHO)γ/θL. The education level of overconﬁdent and unbiased high-
ability workers in the lowest separating equilibrium, ˆ eB, satisﬁes the in-
centive compatibility condition of underconﬁdent and unbiased low-ability
workers as an equality. Thus, ˆ eHO = [ρθL[1 − (α + β)]]
1
γ . In equilibrium,
overconﬁdent and unbiased high-ability workers do not envy underconﬁdent
and unbiased low-ability workers, that is, θH − βρ − (eHO)γ/θH ≥ θL + αρ.
The education level of overconﬁdent and unbiased high-ability workers in
the highest separating equilibrium, ¯ eHO, satisﬁes the incentive compatibility
condition of overconﬁdent and unbiased high-ability workers as an equal-
ity. Thus, ¯ eHO = [ρθH[1 − (α + β)]]
1
γ . The equilibrium wage spread with
biased workers is △wB = (θH − βρ) − (θL + αρ) = ρ[1 − (α + β)]. The
equilibrium wage spread with rational workers (i.e., α = β = κ = ν = 0) is
△w∗ = △wR = θH − θL = ρ. Hence △wB < △wR. Q.E.D.
22Proof of Proposition 5: If inequality (5) is satisﬁed when α = β = 0,
then there is a unique separating equilibrium with rational workers where
low-ability workers get education e∗(θL) and attain utility u∗(θL) and high-
ability workers get education e∗(θH) and attain utility u∗(θH). This separat-
ing equilibrium maximizes welfare. Hence, if inequality (5) is satisﬁed when
α = β = 0, welfare is higher with rational than with biased workers. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: We have that
ˆ W





















If ν = α = 0 we have u(w(eLU),eLU,θL) = u∗(θL). Hence, (15) reduces
to ˆ WB − ˆ W R = λ
￿
u(w(ˆ eHO),ˆ eHO,θH) − u(w(ˆ eH),ˆ eH,θH)
￿
. In the lowest
equilibrium with overconﬁdent workers, the incentive compatibility condi-
tion of unbiased low-ability workers is binding: u∗(θL) = βy(ˆ eHO,θL) + (1 −
β)y(ˆ eHO,θH) − c(ˆ eHO,θL). In the most eﬃcient equilibrium with rational
workers, the incentive compatibility condition of low-ability workers is bind-
ing: u∗(θL) = y(ˆ eH,θH) − c(ˆ eH,θL). Hence, we have βy(ˆ eHO,θL) + (1 −
β)y(ˆ eHO,θH) − c(ˆ eHO,θL) = y(ˆ eH,θH) − c(ˆ eH,θL). This is equivalent to
u(w(ˆ e
HO),ˆ e
















The assumption ceθ < 0 and ˆ eH > ˆ eHO imply c(ˆ eH,θH) − c(ˆ eH,θL) <
c(ˆ eHO,θH)−c(ˆ eHO,θL). Thus, u(w(ˆ eHO), ˆ eHO,θH) < u(w(ˆ eH),ˆ eH,θH) which
implies ˆ WB < ˆ W R Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7: The utility of an unbiased high-ability worker is
u(w(ˆ eHO), ˆ eHO,θH) = y(ˆ eHO,θH)−c(ˆ eHO,θH)−β
￿
y(ˆ eHO,θH) − y(ˆ eHO,θL)
￿
.
The utility of a low-ability worker is u(w(ˆ eH),ˆ eH,θH) = y(ˆ eH,θH)−c(ˆ eH,θH).
Taking a second-order Taylor series expansion of u(w(ˆ eHO),eHO,θH) around
ˆ eH we obtain
u(w(ˆ e
HO),ˆ e


































HO − ˆ e
H)
2. (16)
23The second term on the right-hand side of (16) is negative since β > 0
and output increases with ability. The third term is positive since (i) ˆ eH >
e∗(θH) implies ue(w(ˆ eH), ˆ eH,θH) < 0, (ii) the marginal productivity of ed-
ucation is weakly increasing with ability, and (iii) ˆ eHO < ˆ eH. The impact
of the fourth term is of second-order since (ˆ eHO − ˆ eH)2 is small. Hence,
u(w(ˆ eHO), ˆ eHO,θH) > u(w(ˆ eH),ˆ eH,θH) if (7) is satisﬁed. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8: Welfare in the most eﬃcient separating equilib-
rium with biased workers is
ˆ W













+ (1 − λ + ν)(θL + αρ). (17)
Welfare in the most eﬃcient separating equilibrium with rational workers









+ (1 − λ)θL. (18)
It follows from (17), (18) that welfare with biased workers is higher than
welfare with rational workers if α > [ν + (α + β)(λ − ν)]
ρ
θH. Substituting α
and β and simplifying terms we obtain
ν >
￿
λ(1 − κ) −
(λ − ν)2





Since λ = argminv∈[0,λ]
(λ−ν)2
λ+κ−ν we have that ν > λ(1 − κ)
ρ
θH implies (19).
A necessary condition for a separating equilibrium to exist is that the wage
of underconﬁdent and unbiased low-ability workers is less than the wage of
overconﬁdent and unbiased high-ability workers, that is, (4) must be satisﬁed.








For (19) and (20) to provide a lower and an upper bound for ν, respectively,











Solving this inequality with respect to κ we obtain (8). Thus, (8) and (9)
imply ˆ W R < ˆ W B. Q.E.D.
24